Summary: This article utilizes contemporary evolutionary theory to explain the rise of social differentiation and the increase in social diversity. It provides a conceptual analysis of the evolutionary theories of Parsons and Luhmann with an eye to avoiding some of the fallacies their critics have revealed and proposes a simple four-tier model of social differentiation that may serve as a guide in empirical research.
Introduction: On the Origin of Differentiation
Sociologists have adopted the concept of differentiation in order to capture society's overall structure as well as its long-term evolution. Although for decades differentiation has been an issue primarily for systems theorists, such as Parsons (1967 Parsons ( , 1969 and Luhmann (1977 Luhmann ( , 1997 , the concept has more recently been used by sociologists drawing on social action for their explanations . Although the latter have not been sparing in their criticism of the flaws of using systems theory for tackling the process of differentiation in general, two of their objections are particularly striking. Schimank's (1986) discussion of Parsons and Luhmann revealed that both fail to explain the process of social differentiation by means of evolutionary thinking. That article convincingly demonstrated that this failure is due not to the concepts these "systems theorists" have adopted from the interdisciplinary discourse on systems theory, but rather to their concepts that originate from biology. This critique points to the fact that the idea of social differentiation as a process has, from Spencer on, always been closely related to biological thought (Wagner 1996 (Wagner , 1998 Maasen et al. 1995) . This is clearly the case for who was an alert observer of the synthesis of genetics and evolutionary biology of his time. It is also true for Luhmann (1975a Luhmann ( , 1982a Luhmann ( , 1997 , who drew on Donald T. Campell's (1960 Campell's ( , 1965 interpretation of neo-Darwinist theory. Schimank's analysis is correct in this respect; however, it does not reveal the deeper conceptual reasons for the breakdown in these adoptions of biological thinking. On the grounds of his critique, he tends to reach a rather hasty conclusion that evolutionary thinking about social differentiation must be set aside and be replaced by a theory of social action. Schwinn (1995 Schwinn ( , 2001 Schwinn ( , 2003 has repeatedly emphasized that Parsons' and Luhmann's conception of society's structure as functionally differentiated implies a variety of highly problematic assumptions. In brief, his analyses expose their ideas of differentiation as tightly entangled with intellectual fallacies, such as functionalism and inappropriate holistic views on society. This seems odd, considering the importance, on which Schimank has elaborated, of evolutionary thinking for these theorists, because Darwinism expelled such fallacies centuries ago. Further scrutiny reveals that Parsons and Luhmann cling to systems theory, not evolutionary theory, when it comes to conceiving differentiation as a structural feature of society. Systems theory, in turn, has strong roots, not in Darwinism, but in embryology, anatomy, and engineering (Luhmann 1964; Bertalanffy 1968) . However, Schwinn's pro-posal to cure such remedies resembles that of Schimank; in Schwinn's view, social differentiation must be explained by a theory of social action, as outlined by Max Weber.
Although the objections of Schimank and Schwinn are insightful and plausible, the conclusion that sociology would be better served by explaining social differentiation in terms of a theory of social action is by no means compelling. The idea that social phenomena must be explained by the doing of actors is highly contested in contemporary sociological theory. It has been turned upside down and challenged by the claim that "actors" and "actorhood" cannot be considered the causes of social phenomena, as they themselves are nothing but epiphenomena arising from the interplay of social forces (Luhmann 1997; Meyer & Jepperson 2002; White 2008; Lindemann 2011) .
As a sociologist sharing such views, I will propose a model that adheres to the idea of explaining the process of social differentiation in evolutionary terms. The model will be in the tradition of Spencer, Parsons, Luhmann, and many others in this regard; however, it will seek to avoid the fallacies of older theories by paying much greater attention to the actual concepts of evolutionary reasoning. Therefore, the structure of this article will be twofold.
The first part of the text will provide a conceptual analysis of Parsons and Luhmann as key figures in explaining social differentiation by evolutionary reasoning. 1 Their theorizing will be discussed in light of the growth and structure of evolutionary concepts in biology. I will pay heed to the advice of Ernst Mayr (1998: 504) that social scientists who adopt evolutionary concepts must be fully aware of the structure and explanatory powers of these concepts. The basic problem of so much evolutionary thinking in sociology is not a matter of the concepts that are adopted; rather, the thinking itself is based on misunderstood biology. As Wagner (1996: 94) has argued before, many sociologists have lost touch with the growth of evolutionary thinking and, as a result, are stuck in the biology of the eighteenth century. I will demonstrate that this is the case for Parsons and Luhmann. The discussion of two basic distinctions in modern biology, those of "evolution versus development" and "phylogenesis versus cladogenesis", will be particularly enlightening, as these distinctions demonstrate why Parsons and Luhmann failed in theorizing social differentiation. This analytical section will prepare the ground for an evolutionary explanation of social differentiation free of former mistakes and in line with current evolutionary thought.
The second part of the text will bring contemporary Darwinism and social theory back together and present an evolutionary model of social differentiation. Its concepts will be drawn from modern evolutionary theory of speciation, as developed by Dobzhansky (1937) and, in particular, Mayr (1963) . The explanation will be in the form of a simple, four-tiered model. As neither the theory of social differentiation nor much of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences has been particularly exemplary in empirical research, I will construct the model close to operationalization in a way that generates research questions. The article will conclude by referring to several issues in the research on social differentiation to which the model relates, especially the understanding of social differentiation as a structural feature of society.
In summary, the intellectual ambitions of this model are threefold: explaining social differentiation without appealing to assumptions about social actors, avoiding intellectual fallacies evolutionary approaches had in the past, and establishing an evolutionary framework for empirical research on social differentiation.
2 Parsons, Luhmann, and the growth of evolutionary thought
Most sociologists refer to Parsons and Luhmann as proponents of some type of "systems theory" of society. Although Parsons' and Luhmann's central concepts are based on the interdisciplinary field of systems theory, this characterization is to some degree misleading. Over time, both complemented such concepts with evolutionary thinking. As noted before, in particular, they adopted concepts from evolutionary biology to explain the process of social differentiation. Parsons saw various protagonists of the new synthesis in evolutionary biology at the cradle of his theory of sociocultural change and acknowledged that "here such modern authors as Alfred Emerson, G. G. Simpson, Theodosius Dobzhansky and above Ernst Mayr proved particularly illuminating" (Parsons 1977: 6) . Luhmann, in turn, claimed from the start that his thinking rested, not on systems theory alone, but also on the fields of communication science and evolutionary theory (Luhmann 1975a) . His theory of social evolution owes much to Donald T. Campbell, the celebrated renovator of Darwinian thinking in the social sciences, from whom he adopted the concept of "blind variation and selective retention" (Campbell 1960 (Campbell , 1965 . This concept captured Campbell's take on the biological theory of natural selection.
Most of those who have closely scrutinized such theorizing became skeptical about its perception of evolutionary thinking. Instead of delving deeply into the complicated conceptual analysis that has been done elsewhere in the past (Blute 1979 (Blute , 2002 Haynes 1987; Van den Berghe 1990; Wagner 1999; Wortmann 2010) , the argument put forward here is comparatively simple: I will show that neither Parsons nor Luhmann succeeded in explaining social differentiation by means of evolutionary thinking because they misperceived the explanatory scope and structure of the concepts they chose. It can be shown that Parsons confused the development of organisms with the evolution of species; a mistake one can refer to as the developmental fallacy of evolutionary theorizing. This fallacy is a major source of the problems criticized by Schwinn. Although Luhmann is certainly not without blame in this regard, I will not try to demonstrate that Luhmann's theory suffers from the same problems. In his theory, a different, more blatant problem is obvious: the theory confuses evolutionary explanations of the change of species with explanations of differentiation -or, in biological terms, the speciation of structures -a mistake that can be called the cladogenetic fallacy.
The Developmental Fallacy: From Spencer to Parsons
Parsons (1971) conceives social differentiation as one of four modes of social evolution, all of which relate to the functional requirements that he presumes social systems to have. The main critique that Schimank (1985) raises about such theorizing is that it cannot be considered an explanation in the sense of providing generalized statements about the mechanisms that drive these processes. Rather, it needs to be understood as an analytical classification of social processes. (Schimank 1985: 425) . 3 As an example to support this claim, he cites Parsons' treatment of the differentiation of the capitalist economic system as the aftermath of the enclosure movement.
Although Schimank is certainly right in claiming that Parsons' elaborations are missing an explanatory element, his statement lacks some explanatory power as well because he fails to ask why this is the case; however, it can be shown that Parsons' theoretical failing actually has profound reasons. A closer examination of the intellectual context from which Parsons draws his evolutionary thinking reveals that this failing is owing to exactly those reasons that also evoke the functionalistic and holistic elements in his systems theory. His theory suffers from an developmental (or ontogentic) fallacy, which exists in much evolutionary thinking within the social sciences.
One has to turn to Herbert Spencer to clarify the details of this fallacy. Parsons' theory owes much more to this forerunner of evolutionary thinking than his early polemical claim -"Spencer is dead" -suggests (Wearne 2006) . Among the evolutionists of the nineteenth century, it was Spencer -not Charles Darwin or any other naturalist -who had an impact on Parsons' work (Beetz 2010b: 115ff.) . From today's perspective, what is striking about Spencer (1972 Spencer ( [1857 ) is that his evolutionary theory seeks to explain with a single "universal law of development" two different processes that modern biology thoroughly keeps discrete: The first is the process of growth and differentiation that happens in the course of organismic development; the second is the process of diversification that happens in organic evolution. Biologists refer to the former as ontogenesis and to the latter as phylogenesis (Gould 1977) . Although these organic processes are driven by completely different mechanisms, Spencer refers to both as evolution.
Parsons' theoretical flaws result from adopting a certain conceptual particularity from Spencer. In both authors' works, evolution is modeled after the ontogenetic development of individuals alone (Wagner 1999: 45ff.) . Because of this ontogenetic misunderstanding of the process of evolution, the idea of social evolution as a directional sequence of developmental stages has leaked from developmental biology, especially embryology, into Parsons' theory (1966: 26) . Until his late works, he maintained that the process of social change and differentiation is "most closely analogous to the process of growth in the organism" and a "process of structural differentiation and the concomitant development of patterns and mechanisms, which integrate the differentiated parts" (Parsons 1973: 72) . This is not evolution, but development; this is ontogenesis, not phylogenesis. For this reason, as Blute (1979, 50) has indicated, Parsons' "evolutionary" theory ought, in fact, to be called a "developmental" theory. He has obviously paid only lip service to the evolutionary thinkers in whose tradition he sets himself. Despite all claims, for example, that his concept of society would be "directly parallel to the concept [of populations, H.W.] as it is used by evolutionary biologists, especially Mayr" (Parsons 1977: 6) , Parsons adopted a pseudo-evolutionary theory in the developmental vein of Spencer.
To understand why such a developmental perspective fails to provide explanations beyond narrations about sequences, one must once more turn to biology and the relationship between developmental and evolutionary thinking. Biologists discovered early on that the reasons organisms strive for greater differentiation and the reasons species multiply are different. They argued that the development of an organism could be explained only in terms of the evolutionary path a species has followed. Ontogenetic theories of development in biology are able to explain how organisms move through different stages in a sequence of conditions (e.g., from egg to embryo, from embryo to adulthood), yet they rely on evolutionary theory to explain where these stages come from and what they look like. It is for these reasons that Parsons' developmental theory is limited to listing particular stages of social development instead of providing systematic evolutionary explanations. His theory suffers from the problem of having confused the explanatory powers of evolutionary theory with those of ontogenetic theories; it suffers from what one might call the developmental fallacy.
The Cladogenetic Fallacy: From Campbell to Luhmann
The literature has indicated that the argument about developmentalism put forward for Parsons can be extended to Luhmann's theory as well (Blute 2002; Wortmann 2010) . However, instead of repeating this line of reasoning, it is more instructive to focus on a different fallacy about evolutionary thinking that can be found in his work. What is more blatant in Luhmann's theory is that he has failed to acknowledge another fundamental distinction of evolutionary theory concerning the origin and change of structures. These two aspects of evolution are explained by different subtheories within Darwinian thought, and it can be shown that Luhmann chose to adopt the wrong subtheory to explain the differentiation of social systems.
As Mayr has shown, modern Darwinian theorizing can be divided into five logically independent theories (Mayr 1985 (Mayr , 2005 Futuyama 1998: 21) . Each of these theories seeks to explain a different aspect of the evolutionary process. The most prominent among them is the theory of natural selection, explaining the change and adaptation of populations, their anagenesis. However, as R.A. Fischer (1930: 1) felt compelled to state early on that "natural selection is not evolution," because a variety of other processes occur in evolution. Among those, only the theory of speciation (or cladogenesis) is of relevance here. This theory explains the process in which new species originate by the branching of populations. In biology, basically everything that sociologists usually mean when talking about the process of differentiation (e.g., the rise of higher forms of diversity, the origin of differences and structural complexity) is explained by this theory of speciation. These phenomena are not explained by the theory of natural selection. One has to distinguish between the explanation of how these forms change (in anagenetic processes) and the explanation of how these forms differentiate (in cladogenetic processes). The former type of explanation is provided by the theory of natural selection; it explains the change of existing populations, yet does not explain their structural differentiation or the rise of higher degrees of diversity. The latter explanation is the theory of speciation, which is about the origin and multiplication of species.
The point here is that Luhmann has adopted the wrong part of evolutionary theory to explain the origin and differentiation of social systems. He has mistaken the explanatory powers of the theory of natural selection for those of the theory of speciation. It is for historical reasons that most sociologists, including Luhmann, do not recognize these conceptual differences in evolutionary thinking:
The theory of speciation evolved no earlier than the middle of the twentieth century, in what is called the Grand Synthesis of evolutionary theory (Gould 1984: 255; Wortmann 2010) . Based on Dobzhansky's (1937) work, Mayr (1942 Mayr ( , 1963 formulated the model of allopatric speciation, which explains the origin of species by the geographic separation of formerly unified populations and the reproductive incompatibility that might arise from that separation. However, there is no such cladogenetic theorizing on the origin of structural diversity in the works of Niklas Luhmann. His interpretation of evolutionary theory is drawn from the works of Donald T. Campbell (1960 Campbell ( , 1965 ) who worked on a general theory of change and structural adaption. Campbell drew on both the theory of natural selection and the cybernetic theory of learning and assumed the mechanisms of "variation, selection, and retention" to propel a broad variety of processes of change and adaptation (such as sociocultural evolution, problem solving, eyesight, creativity, and the like). Luhmann (1997: 454) took this idea further and conceived the mechanisms of variation, selection, and stabilization to drive society's evolution and differentiation. Despite that similarity, there is a small, but extremely important, difference between Campbell's reading of the theory of natural selection and what Luhmann made of it. Campbell intended his theory to explain change and adaptation, a use that is completely in line with the anagenetic concepts he adopted. Luhmann basically applies the same concepts; however, he uses them to explain the origins and structural differentiation of systems. This seems odd, considering that these concepts stem from the theory of natural selection, not from the theory of speciation. Luhmann's evolutionary theory confuses the explanatory claims of the theory of natural selection with those of the theory of speciation. The concepts he adopts via Campell simply do not explain where the origin and differentiation of structural forms originate; they are supposed to provide answers regarding the change of structures, not their differentiation.
Instead of having adopted the adequate evolutionary subtheory of speciation, Luhmann deviates from evolutionary thinking and presents a peculiar blend of functionalism and the theory of natural selection to explain the origin of systems as a result of an inherent requirement of social systems to deal with complexity (Luhmann 1997: 488ff.) . This argument that Luhmann proposes for the origin of social systems suffers from reverting into the classic problems of functionalism: explaining a phenomenon's origin by naming the functional requirement it serves (or in Aristotelian terms, its final cause) is open to the classic critique of being pseudo-argumentation (Elster 1982 (Elster , 1983 . Such a critique could have been avoided if Luhmann had adopted the appropriate concepts from evolutionary thinking; his theory suffers from what one may call the cladogenetic fallacy concerning evolutionary theory.
It seeks to explain the origin and differentiation of social systems by means of the wrong part of evolutionary thinking.
On the Evolutionary Explanation of Social Differentiation
The preceding discussion has confirmed the critique that Parsons and Luhmann do not succeed in explaining social differentiation because of their misconceptions of social evolution; they fail to match what they seek to explain with the corresponding concepts. Parsons confuses -in a Spencerian wayconcepts that explain ontogenetic processes with those explaining phylogenetic evolution; Luhmann's evolutionary theory is based on the mistaken idea that social differentiation must be explained by a functionalist adoption of the theory of natural selection. However, these results do not imply -as Schimank and Schwinn have suggested -that social differentiation must be explained by a theory of social action.
In a somewhat more conservative reaction to these problems, I will argue in the remainder of the text that such conclusions are hasty, and I will make a plea for the older evolutionary tradition in explaining social differentiation. The preceding analysis has taught several lessons on how to adopt that tradition in the social sciences. The explanation proposed is conservative in that it does not abandon evolutionary theorizing in general, yet obviously the previously unveiled conceptual aberrations urge a more progressive adoption of evolutionary thinking. Although the conceptual elements of the model to be presented are essentially a part of the canon of sociological reasoning, their elementary logic will be drawn from today's Darwinian evolutionary theory, not from any direct successor in social thought. Like modern evolutionary theorizing, and unlike Parsons and Luhmann, the model will conceive of social differentiation as a phylogenetic and cladogenetic process. Given the uneven history of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences, and all the obscurities and misunderstandings surrounding it, the very idea of such a Darwinist explanation of social phenomena requires certain preliminary remarks.
First, it must be stressed that a model of evolutionary differentiation based on modern Darwinism is not subject to some of the older objections -if not to say, prejudices -against evolutionism in the social sciences (Giddens 1984; Sanderson 1990 ). It will be in the vein of the new strand of literature on social evolution that has emerged in the past thirty years (cf. Wortmann 2010). Most approaches in that strand have rid themselves of older problematic concepts, with the problem of pseudo-evolutionary developmental theorizing only one of them. Modern evolutionary thought in the social sciences is not teleological because Darwinian theory perceives evolution to be an open process of continuous change. Nor is it necessarily reductionist, as one can assume evolutionary mechanisms to occur on a genuinely socio-cultural level that is independent of organic evolution. It is not deterministic, and it does not imply any ideas about the absolute optimality or superiority of evolutionary results, as such results are to be understood in relation to temporary environmental conditions and fellow forms. Finally, although Darwinism has been abused for justifying political, racist, or eugenic views, evolutionary theory itself is free of such views.
A second remark concerns the style of evolutionary theorizing. Although evolutionary thinking has, in the past, been considered a tarnished playground of armchair theorists, most of the more recent evolutionary approaches in the social sciences have succeeded in adopting it for empirical research. The following explanation will ascribe some importance to current evolutionary thinking as a research paradigm in order to close the gap between empirical research and theoretical reasoning for which the theory of social differentiation has been criticized (Greve & Kronenberg 2011) . As a consequence, the following explanation will be much closer to an empirical research model than the ingenious reasoning of some masters of sociological theory about this issue. It will focus on a simple four-tier evolutionary logic of differentiation, and it will suggest research questions about the mechanisms on which that logic rests.
Third, for this purpose, the model will take advantage of the fact that two different sets of questions concerning evolution must be distinguished. The first, "classic" Darwinian, set of questions is about the central processes of evolution itself. Darwin did not know anything about the genetic mechanisms underlying inheritance and mutation; however, this did not stop him from establishing the outlines of modern evolutionary biology. The questions tackled here are about the rise of adaptation and diversification. In the social sciences, the population ecology approach of Hannan & Freeman (1977 and the human behavioral ecology in ethnology (Hames 2001; Winterhader & Smith 2000) illustrate this set of evolutionary reasoning. The model that is provided subsequently will offer a clear theory of how the process of social differentiation can be explained in such evolutionary terms. The second, rather "modern" set of questions focuses on the mechanisms behind evolutionary processes. Just as the modern synthesis of evolutionary biology benefited greatly from illuminating the genetic mechanisms of inheritance and variation, it is equally of interest in the social sciences to ask about the mechanisms of social evolution. The blind-variation selective-retention approach of Donald T. Campbell is built around such questions. The model provided here will not try to provide theoretical explanations about what mechanisms cause the process of evolutionary differentiation; rather it will point out research topics concerning these mechanisms. It will present the logic of differentiation, as outlined by evolutionary theory in biology, as an explanation; however, the mechanisms that cause this differentiation will be considered as a matter of empirical research. It is a "simple" model in that it excludes such questions here.
Fourth, evolutionary thinking has been adopted by a variety of approaches in the social sciences that differ substantially in their basic assumptions about society. It has proved to be compatible with a broad range of ideas about the social world. In order to present the logic for evolutionary differentiation to a wider sociological audience, I will construct the following model in terms that are not exclusive to specific sociological approaches. In other words, it will be conceived neither as a theory of the differentiation of social systems, nor as a specific theory of differentiation for meaning, networks, or actions. Instead of referring to the differentiation of actions, systems, meanings, or the like, this model will refer to the vague term of "differentiation within social forms." It is also a "simple" model in that it is deliberately underspecified in sociological terms.
Fifth, for the sake of clarity, the model simplifies the state of research in evolutionary biology in two ways. It singles out one particular mode of speciation among those that are known in biology. The process of allopatric speciation is the most common source of organic speciation but not the only one. How far the others might serve as blueprints for sociological discourses is subject to further investigation. In addition, this model will adopt the assumption that the process of selection is a driving force of evolution. This neglects the insight that there are other powerful mechanisms causing evolutionary change, which might also be observed in the social world.
Finally, it must be stressed that the model presents a very fundamental process of structural diversifi-cation, but not the only one. Especially in the social world, much differentiation may be due to the effects of group selection (Boyd & Richerson 2002) ; however, these processes need to be captured by different models.
A Simple Evolutionary Model of Social Differentiation
Most social scientists that have dealt seriously with evolutionary biology have been astonished by the extent to which its basic assumptions resemble certain ideas in social theory (Hirshleifer 1977; Mesoudi 2007) . Evolutionary thought has always relied on substantial intellectual exchanges between biologists and social theorists (Hodgson 1994; Gould & Lewontin 1979) . The concepts presented in this paper are no exception. Although the overall procedural logic of evolutionary differentiation presented here may itself be new, it nevertheless aggregates a variety of concepts that are rather familiar to sociologists. The logic depicted in this model draws on certain developments in evolutionary biology now known as the Grand Synthesis. Particularly, the theory of speciation will be utilized for a simple procedural scheme that explains the rise of differentiation. This scheme will be presented briefly; however, the concepts fleshing out the "bones" of this scheme will be discussed in greater detail in their sociological context.
Theodosius Dobzhansky (1937 ) and, especially, Ernst Mayr (1942 , 1963 pioneered the biological theory of speciation by rethinking the impact of geographic factors that foster discontinuities between species. Today, modern biologists call the main process leading to speciation allopatric speciation. Its procedural logic can be broken down into a sequence of four distinct events which can be used to explain the rise of social differentiation and the rise of new species. In terms that are abstract enough to capture both the organic and social processes of evolutionary differentiation, these events can be depicted in the following manner: In the beginning, (1) a population of certain forms settles in a given environment. That population gets (2) divided into two separated populations by the formation of certain barriers. Once that happens, these populations face different environmental conditions and might (3) diverge in their evolutionary trajectories, for example, by the process of natural selection. Finally, (4) evolution gives rise to isolative mechanisms that prevent the once-united populations from melding again, after the barriers disappear that disconnected them. Once all of these steps have been completed, speciation (or, in sociological terms, differentiation) has occurred and has given rise to a higher level of diversity.
This sequence, and the overall process of speciation that it constitutes, serve as a point of departure for modeling the logic of social differentiation in the following sections. I will demonstrate that such concepts as populations, barrier formation, change, and isolative mechanisms can easily be utilized, and have already been utilized in detail, for sociological reasoning. Throughout the text, I will turn to the multiplication of epistemic cultures (Knorr 1999) in science as an instance of evolutionary differentiation in modern society. Although the idea of speciation has not been applied to this domain yet, the example draws on the tradition of evolutionary accounts of science outlined by Kuhn (1962) , Toulmin (1972) , Popper (1982) , Campbell (1973) , and Hull (1988). 
Social Populations
The first step of modeling social differentiation in evolutionary terms is to conceive social phenomena as populations. Remarkably, the idea of describing social phenomena in terms of populations is older than Darwin's theory of evolution. It was Thomas R. Malthus' early contribution to human demography, "An Essay on the Principle of Population" (1798), that gave Darwin (1887: 83) substantial clues for his theory. Obviously, modern sociology is more than simply human demographics; the concept of a "population" has today outgrown its original meaning and has entered its conceptual canon. It was popularized in early American sociology by the human ecology approach that arose as part of the Chicago School of sociology. Authors such as Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (Park & Burgess 1921; Park 1936) , and Roderick D. McKenzie (1924 McKenzie ( , 1926 applied this concept to capture the social diversity within urban spaces. These authors still used the term population to describe the differences of human populations; however, they departed from its basic organic meaning by using it to describe the sociocultural diversity of such populations. Drawing on this tradition (which was passed on by Amos Hawley [1950] ), the current "population ecology approach" in organizational sociology (Hannan & Freeman 1977 McKelvey & Aldrich 1983) has refined the concept further for a theory of organizational diversity, change, and adaptation. Here, the evolution of organizational forms is understood as the adaptation of organizational populations to their environments. In sociology's neighboring disciplines, the concept is implicit to nearly any evolutionary approach, for example, populations of firms in economics (Nelson & Winter 1982 Nelson 1995; Witt 2008) , populations of strategies in anthropology (Cronk & Chagnon 2000; Winterhalder & Smith 1992) , or populations of cultural patterns and memes in cultural theory (Boyd & Richerson 1985 .
All in all, one can conclude that, as with ecological thinking in sociology in general, the concept of populations has been detached from its original physical meaning and has been reoriented toward the analysis of various abstract social forms that are conceived as populations. The concept, as it is used today, is broad enough to capture a variety of social phenomena. For example, epistemic cultures can easily be conceived as populations. The concept highlights that they are heterogeneous and homogeneous at the same time. Whereas scientific cultures rely to a certain degree on shared interpretations, beliefs, norms, and claims, there is plenty of evidence of differences between the sciences and within sciences. To illustrate evolutionary differentiation, we may simply understand a scientific community as the set of diverse and sometimes contrasting cultural forms that make up the episteme of a discipline.
For a more precise definition of the term population, one may start again in biology, where a population is commonly understood as a group of one species of organisms that interbreed and that live in the same place at the same time. For our purpose, social populations need to be defined more abstractly, as any set of social forms of the same kind that are reproduced in a given physical or sociocultural environment. Obviously, such a vague definition needs further clarification, starting with the problem of classifying phenomena as belonging to "the same kind," an obstinate intellectual problem for sociologists (Lazarsfeld 1962; Cappechi 1968; Bailey 1994) , biologists (Hull 1965a (Hull , 1965b Mayr 1984) , as well as numerous philosophers (Quine 1961; Hacking 1990; LaPorte 1994) . In all of these disciplines, the old philosophical doctrine of essentialism has turned out to be a major epistemic obstacle, for different reasons.
In this article, it is sufficient to indicate just one of the problems of these discussions. The two disciplines primarily in question here, sociology and biology, have dealt with dissimilar aspects of the aforementioned doctrine. In sociology, essentialism became the "bogeyman" of most constructivist approaches. In biology, the essentialist (or "typological") view that species must be understood as fixed groups of organisms of the same kind, united by essential morphological features, was the dominant view for centuries. This changed with the rise of the biological species concept, based on the "populational view" that Darwin proposed, which conceived populations as reproductive communities with organic forms of the "same kind" strictly understood in terms of their common descent.
Research pragmatism certainly dictates that one perceive populations of social forms by easy-to-observe, obvious features; however, for theoretical reasons, it is worth stressing that this model of evolutionary differentiation is built upon the old idea that reproduction is what matters most in society (Marx 1890). It follows the conceptual shift in biology from typological to populational thinking, an idea that at first may seem more exotic to sociologists than it actually is. Population thinking is about the historical relationship of particular social phenomena to their forerunners. Most sociologists will agree with the statement that there is nothing new under the sun in the social world: Any social phenomenon repeats an older one, as it reenacts older scripts, restages former roles, iterates given meanings, or refers to former communications. At the center of populational thinking is the simple idea that the diversity of such social phenomena should not be classified by any "essential" properties, such as belonging to "the economy," "science," or a specific functional equivalence. A strictly populational perspective builds the taxonomy of social diversity, and thereby the structure of social differentiation, on the ground of the heritage of social forms. It focuses on the heritage lines of reproducing forms, and what causes them; in current sociology, Thomas Luckmann's (1986) concept of Kommunikative Gattungen (communicative species/ genres/genera) comes closest to this idea.
Whatever serves as a guideline for the classification of a social population, the population's diversity must be depicted in empirical terms. As a research strategy, any model of the social differentiation of populations of social forms, whether these be organizations, strategies, patterns of meaning, or whatever, must start with an observation of the diverse traits, and their distribution, within the population in question. The methods used to grasp such data differed in the past in evolutionary literature; the "naturalist tradition in sociology" (Lofland 1969) , represented by the Chicago School's research on urban diversity, favors qualitative methods. More recently, the interdisciplinary discourse on social ecologies and social evolution has adopted a variety of powerful mathematical tools for modeling social evolution and, as part of that, social populations (Henrich & McElreath 2007) .
The description of social diversity must be distinguished from the set of questions about what mechanisms are driving the reproduction of such social populations. It is a common misperception that an evolutionary theory in the social sciences requires some kind of conceptual pendant on the biological notion of DNA. Alternatively, one may assume a variety of different mechanisms that explain the cause of reproduction in the social world. The question of which mechanisms contribute to reproduction is open to empirical research. Donald T. Campbell (1965: 38ff.) , for example, who always pled for an empirical approach to such questions, saw the entire apparatus of socializing agents at work in society, and highlighted the role of the media.
Barrier Formation
Once the characteristics of such a social population have been grasped, one can move on to the second stage of evolutionary speciation: barrier formation. Although biologists distinguish several processes of speciation (Futuyama 1998), the simple model presented here draws only on the process of allopatric speciation. Biological theory supposes that this mode of speciation requires some kind of physical barrier (such as mountain ranges, valleys, glacial masses, land bridges, or water) to emerge and separate a given organic population into two different subpopulations, preventing the exchange of individuals between these two geographical spaces.
Historically, sociocultural diversity originated as much from the geographical separation of populations as organic diversity did. Most anthropologists agree that modern man stemmed from a single branch of Homo sapiens that left Africa some ten thousand years ago (Fleagle 2010) . That population dispersed geographically and established the seedbeds on which several societies and cultures emerged in isolation. With the rise of globalization, the importance of spatial barriers separating sociocultural forms has decreased. Drawing again on ecological arguments in the social sciences, one may argue that the relevant barriers today arise by changes, not in physical space, but rather in abstract social spaces. In conceptual terms, one may extend such argumentation from physical barriers to social barriers, just as "ecological arguments have also been extended from physical urban spaces to abstract social spaces" (Abbott 2005: 245) . Building on the assumption that social diversity has never been greater in society than it is today, one may assume that a variety of such abstract social barriers exist.
For the sake of modeling, the process of barrier formation in the social world may be defined in abstract terms as any occurrence in the environment of a social population that divides the population in such a way that its subpopulations do not considerably interchange later. Like the previous definition of a population, this definition requires further clarification of the term environment. Both in biology and sociology, it has been useful to break down the entirety of environmental conditions into a mosaic of several niches (Popielarz & Neal 2007) . Niche theory has not only turned out to be a useful theoretical concept in these disciplines but is also very instructive for modeling the environment. Organizational researchers Hannan et al. (2003: 210) describe this in the following manner:
Analytic niche theories trace back to G. Evelyn Hutchinson's (1957 Hutchinson's ( , 1978 abstract geometric definition of the niche as the hyper volume formed by the set of points in an N-dimensional environmental space for which the population's growth rate (fitness) is nonnegative. This niche is called "fundamental" because it refers to the physiological capacities of the members of the population. That is, the relevant constraints apply even when a population is isolated from potentially competing populations. Organizational ecology applies this conception to the world of organizations. Such application requires extensive knowledge of the social, economic, and political conditions needed to sustain a form of organization and of the limits on structure and action embodied in the organizational form.
Just as it has been conceptually extended from the organic world to the world of organizations, niche theory can be applied to any other social phenomenon. One must note that this modern definition of the niche captures first and foremost the range of environmental conditions under which a population can persist, not directly the environment itself.
As an analytical concept it refers to certain properties of a population in that respect, not to properties of the environment; however, it enables the researcher to single out environmental conditions relevant for a specific population and to analyze their impact on its evolution. Without exclusively referring to geographic isolation, social barrier formation can be modeled on the grounds of niche theory as the fragmentation of a population in an n-dimensional space of social forms by an incident that distributes its forms to at least two n 1 -and n 2 -dimensional spaces. This definition is abstract enough to capture the diversity with which empirical incidences give rise to such barriers.
For example, one may remember from the international discourse of the discipline of sociology (Rammstedt 1986; Kaesler 2002 ) that the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 split German sociologists and isolated those inclined toward the National Socialist ideology and their project of a "Vçl-kische Soziologie." To present a different example, Goffman's (1963) work on stigmatization has sparked empirical research on how stigmas are constructed. Such literature can be understood as dealing with the processes of social barrier formationwith stigmas separating "normal" identities from those bearing the stigma. In more abstract terms, one may guess that any process of classification (or processes of changing classification systems) may contribute to the separation of social populations; for example, the invention of new classification criteria divides environmentally harmful firms from ecologically conscious firms, educational achievers from non-achievers, and debtors who are creditworthy from those who are not.
Epistemic communities, may be divided by a variety of barriers: Empirical findings may question existing truths, separating those who trust the prevailing dogma and those who suppose that these findings call for new explanations. It may turn out that a certain field of study must be decomposed into different sets of questions, thereby separating those focusing on one and those focusing on the other. New technologies affecting the research methodologies of a discipline may emerge, separating those who have access to these technologies and those who do not. Changes in the political environment of an epistemic community may affect such a community in various ways, with the separation of scientific communities in wartime being the most dramatic.
One may note that this model of evolutionary differentiation distinguishes between two phenomena that are both referred to as "differentiation" in the older literature: The separation of social forms by the emergence of social barriers is per se not supposed to be differentiation because no new social phenomena will arise just because a population of social forms becomes isolated. In this perspective, all processes outlined by the model must be completed for social differentiation to occur.
Divergent Evolution
Once a barrier has separated two populations, these populations may change and thereby acquire substantial differences in traits over time. One may call these processes of change divergent evolution. It is an erroneous perception of evolutionary thinking that only the mechanism of (natural) selection causes population change; a variety of evolutionary mechanisms besides selection can cause change. Biologists distinguish at least three other evolutionary mechanisms that act upon populations. Processes such as genetic drift, gene flow, genetic hitchhiking, and mutation are other sources of substantial change in organic populations (Futuyama 1998). Again, it is open to empirical research whether there are counterparts of such organic mechanisms in social evolution or whether completely different mechanisms of change need to be identified. Also, the effect of group selection may interlock most easily here with the process of evolutionary differentiation.
However, processes that resemble natural selection have been observed in society for a long time, and the idea of evolutionary selection has turned into a useful conceptual tool for a variety of disciplines (Müller 2010; Wortmann 2010 ) during the past decades. Any model of evolutionary differentiation of society would be incomplete without incorporating some idea of how evolutionary change happens. For these reasons, a brief discussion of the process of evolutionary selection in the social world is required. Considering the oddities of some evolutionary thinking in the social sciences, it is useful to return to Darwin's original concept of natural selection as a starting point. Darwin's "one long argument" (1859) about evolutionary change through natural selection rests on five empirical observations and three inferences (Mayr 1998: 384; Gould 2002: 125) , shown in Table 2 .
Darwin took, from Paley and Malthus, the idea that all populations have the potential to increase in size exponentially, but as a point of fact, the number of individuals in a given population tends to stay at a certain level most of the time. Further, Darwin saw that the resources needed for the reproduction of individuals are limited. From these three observations, he concluded that there is competition between individuals for those resources. Next, Darwin drew on the insights of animal breeders and taxonomists with two observations of individuals. He broke with the doctrine of essentialism by acknowledging that no two individuals are the same within a population and that there is always some variability in populations. Additionally, he saw that at least some of this variability was heritable. Darwin concluded that if individuals compete, and if they are all unique, then some individuals have traits that will increase their probability of reproducing in larger numbers. As their offspring inherit the advantageous traits that made them more successful than others, the incidence of these traits will increase over the course of generations, and the population will change and adapt to its environment.
In the past, there have been a variety of suggestions on how such processes need to be conceived in sociology, the most recent being made by Blute (2010) , Lenski (2003) , Turner (2003) , Turner & Maryanski (2008), and Runciman (2009) . This evolutionary theorizing is accomplished by approaches in the same vein as in ethnology, cultural anthropology, archaeology, social psychology, and, of course, economics (Wortmann 2010) . A proper discussion of a full-fledged model of the mechanisms of social selection that acknowledges this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. In the most abstract terms, any of the models used by these approaches contains assumptions about (a) the diverse traits of a given population, for example, different strategies, routines, and sociocultural or organizational forms, about (b) certain environmental conditions, such as the natural surroundings in human behavioral ecology or markets in evolutionary economics, and about (c) how these conditions act in a selective way on a given population, for example, by differentiating between revenues among firms in an industry or by differentiating between calorie yields among hunting strategies. Since descriptions of the population in question and its environment are already required for the overall model, what is left for empirical research is to clarify by which mechanism selection does operate. (Mayr 1998) It is important to bear in mind that this model is, strictly speaking, about the forces of natural selection acting on two different subpopulations which are located in different surroundings. It is about the divergent evolution of the parts of a once-united population whose evolutionary paths diverge after the process of barrier formation has separated them. As these separated subpopulations face different environmental conditions, the different selective pressures of their respective surroundings may yield different outcomes. Explaining those outcomes requires separate specifications of the model. What is striking about this process of divergent evolution is that within the populations in question, as an incidental by-product of selection, certain features may emerge that keep the populations isolated, even if the barriers that have separated them disappear. Once that happens and mechanisms of reproductive isolation have emerged, the process of evolutionary differentiation is complete. Returning to the example of epistemic communities, divergent evolution is easy to imagine: Views on the subject may diverge more and more; theorizing on certain subjects may be based on completely different assumptions over time; different research methodologies may yield different results which in turn call for completely different follow-up research; whereas one political climate may foster certain lines of research, a different one will foster another; thus will foci of attention, interpretations, beliefs, norms, and claims of the two separated subpopulations diverge over time.
Mechanisms of Reproductive Isolation
The key point of this model is that once an initial population of social forms has been divided into two different populations by the rise of some barrier, these different populations may acquire certain characteristics in the course of their further evolution that prevent them from reproducing together, even if, at some point, the respective barrier vanishes. They have, as biologists say, acquired certain mechanisms of reproductive isolation. Once these mechanisms have been established, the process of speciation is complete, and the differentiation of forms has occurred. In biology, such mechanisms are understood as any morphological, behavioral, or genetic feature that prevents species from interbreeding. Individuals may fail to interbreed, for example, because of genomic incompatibilities, because their preferred habitats for mating do not overlap, or simply because their morphological differences do not allow them to mate. In more abstract terms, such mechanisms must be understood as any circumstance that prevents populations from blending together.
In the social sciences, it is, again, the population ecology approach in organizational theory that has dealt most explicitly with the concept of reproductive isolation. More specifically, McKelvey & Aldrich (1983) Comps in many populations are complicated and difficult to learn. Many managers speak of the years it takes to "learn the business". Engineers, professors, lawyers, doctors, and many other professionals spend years being educated. Others in building trades, police and fire protection, military, etc., spend many years of apprenticeship or other experience-building time gaining knowledge, on the job. All of this makes learning the comps of a population difficult and so isolates the comps of one population from those of other populations. Finally, the tendency to resist learning of other comps, to be suspicious of new knowledge, to be suspicious of outsiders or of ideas "not invented here" also isolates the comps of different populations.
In contrast to biological theory that conceives isolative mechanisms as definitive barriers of species, the population ecology approach assumes that such isolative mechanisms might vanish over time, allowing blending processes of organizational populations.
Once more, this biological concept can clearly be extended beyond the organic world and into the world of organizations. The history of science, for example, is full of examples of small differences, concerning certain assumptions, that have kept scientific schools and even disciplines apart (e.g., Suµrez-Díaz 2009 , Cahn 2001 ). In the case of epistemic communities, divergent evolution may have yielded certain different features that keep them apart. One subpopulation may build its theorizing on assumptions that are unacceptable for the others, starting with basic epistemological questions and ending with subtle differences in theorizing. Different methodologies may yield results that simply do not matter in other subfields of study.
Additionally, one can turn to the works of Norbert Elias (1969 Elias ( , 1982 and Pierre Bourdieu (1987) for such mechanisms of a less epistemic kind; these can be read as studies on those habitual symbols of distinction, acting as isolative mechanisms that keep milieus or classes apart. Again, it is worth stressing that isolative mechanisms in the social world might be numerous and diverse, making such questions matters of empirical investigation, rather than matters of theoretical consideration; however, any model of evolutionary differentiation must focus not only on the process of differentiation, per se, but also on the mechanisms that maintain the results of that process. By doing so, it sheds some light on those questions of dedifferentiation that have always implied by the theory of differentiation.
Once such mechanisms of reproduction have emerged, the four-tier sequence of evolutionary differentiation has been completed and has given rise to a higher level of social diversity.
Conclusion
Most generally speaking, the model was built to contribute to an explanation of social differentiation that does not appeal to assumptions about social actors, that avoids intellectual fallacies former evolutionary approaches had, and that serves as an evolutionary framework for empirical research on social differentiation. One a more specific level, the foregoing analysis has confirmed the critique that both Parsons and Luhmann failed to explain social differentiation in evolutionary terms. It has shed light on the conceptual grounds for this circumstance and has prepared an explanation of social differentiation in terms of modern evolutionary theory. The model briefly outlined in this article depicts the process of differentiation as a four-tier phylogenetic and cladogenetic process of evolution. The concepts molded into this model can be, and have been, utilized in social sciences and biology. Furthermore, the analysis has indicated how this model may serve as a framework for empirical research of social differentiation. The proposed model is restricted to a skeleton of an evolutionary explanation of differentiation; thus, it does not focus on the structural, ecological aspects of that process. Such a simple model requires further elaboration of its genuinely sociological concepts just as much as it requires elaboration of the concepts adopted from the interdisciplinary discourse on evolutionary theory. The agenda for future research outlined here, which may guide such elaborations, is twofold: On one hand, it will need to concentrate on the description of populational diversity and environmental conditions and on causal connections between populations and environments -both within the process of differentiation. On the other hand, it needs to focus on the mechanisms of social evolution, such as the formation of social barriers, means of transmission, and reproductive isolation.
One may criticize the model for its vagueness in theoretical terms. In light of both the body of literature on social differentiation and the recent body of literature on evolutionary theory, this vagueness may be more of an opportunity than a problem, as it enables empirical work to be conducted on an issue that has been treated as primarily a theoretical problem in the past. Such empirical research does not come at the cost of theoretical finesse, at least not if it is guided by the conceptual framework of evolutionary theory. Once this framework is applied to sociology, it turns out to offer fresh views of a variety of classical problems in sociological thought.
Obviously, the proposed model relates directly to a variety of questions raised in the debate on social differentiation. First, it begins, as outlined, with the origin of differentiation. The perspective offered here does not rely on causal assumptions about actors. Despite all that Parsons and Luhmann have claimed, evolutionary theory does not refer to holistic entities, such as "society" or "functional systems"; rather, it explains social differentiation as an ongoing evolutionary process constituted by efficient causes. Second, Adam Smith (1904 Smith ( [1776 ) has claimed that social differentiation is driven by certain increases in efficiency, for example, in the division of labor. The evolutionary perspective developed here rejects the causality proposed in that argument; nevertheless, it is able to explain how efficiency is increased during the evolutionary process by virtue of the optimizing force of selective processes. This assumption is fundamental to evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter 1982) . Third, the literature on this issue commonly uses "differentiation" to refer to two different processes which this model analytically keeps separate. No distribution or separation of social forms (over the n-dimensional space of social conditions) must be considered differentiation; instead, the model distinguishes between social forms separated by barriers and those differentiated through the process of speciation as depicted above. Fourth, the perspective proposed is able to explain processes of differentiation, non-differentiation, and dedifferentiation. The first process is explained by the model which can also be deployed to explain why differ-entiation does not happen. Dedifferentiation may be explained through the decline of mechanisms of reproductive isolation.
I conclude with a fifth, and final, issue that is central within the issue of differentiation. This article focuses on differentiation as a process, not as a structural feature of society. This raises the question of how evolutionary theory relates to a description of structural differentiation in the social world. Luhmann and Parsons answered that question in terms of systems theory, an approach that is understandable in the historical development of their theories, but that is not conceptually sound. The perspective that complemented evolutionary theory from the start in describing the structural entanglements of the world is not systems theory, but ecological thinking. It is for this reason that the ecological tradition in sociology, as established in the Chicago School, refers to the concept of social ecologies in the description of social structures. Since the 1970s, the misbelief has spread that the concept of ecologies refers to the relationship of populations with their environment. In the original formulation proposed by Haeckel (1866) , it refers to the overall structure of the relationship of organic forms -an understanding that has been transferred into sociology by Park & McKenzie (1921) . The concept of ecologies has seen a revival in the past decades (Abbott 2005) and it might prove to be a useful tool for the analysis of differentiated social structures in the future since it involves a perception of society as an "entangled bank" of social phenomena.
